State of Utah v. Alfredo Gutierrez : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
State of Utah v. Alfredo Gutierrez : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark A. Flores; Attorney for Appellant.
Kris C. Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Gutierrez, No. 20060544 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6603
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Appeal No. 20060544-CA 
Trial Court No. 051100099 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE BEN HADFIELD 
BRD2F OF APPELLANT 
Mark A. Flores, Utah Bar # 8429 
2150 South 1300 East 
Suite #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(801) 518-3737 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Kris C. Leonard, Utah Bar # 4902 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
(801) 366-0180 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appelle 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 0 9 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




Appeal No. 20060544-CA 
Trial Court No. 051100099 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE BEN HADFIELD 
BRD2F OF APPELLANT 
Mark A. Flores, Utah Bar # 8429 
2150 South 1300 East 
Suite #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(801) 518-3737 
Kris C. Leonard, Utah Bar # 4902 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
(801) 366-0180 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appelle 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 




ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETRIMINTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 3 
Nature Of The Case 3 
Course Of The Proceedings Below 4 
Disposition In The Court Below 6 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. OFFICER GERFEN'S REQUEST TO SEARCH 
GUTIERREZ VIOLATEDARTICLE I, §14 
BECAUSE IT EXCEEDED, WITHOUT 
REASONABLE SUSPICION, THE SCOPE AND 
PURPOSE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP 11 
II. OFFICER GERFEN' SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS NOT 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE TERRY DOCTRINE BECAUSE 
HE LACKED REASONABLE SUSPCION THAT 
GUTIERREZ WAS ARMED OR OTHEWISE POSED A 
THREAT TO OFFICER SAEFTY 14 
III. GUTIERREZ DID NOT CONSENT TO THE SEARCH ,17 
A. Gutierrez's Consent Was Not Voluntary 17 
B. Gutierrez's Consent Resulted From The Police 
Exploitation Of His Illegal Detention 19 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING OFFICER'S 
GERFEN'S SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS INCIDENT 
TO A VALID ARREST 21 
A. The Trial Court's Committed Clear Error When It 
Found The Beer Bottle In Gutierrez's Car Contained 
Alcohol 22 
V. OFFICER GERFEN' S SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS 
NOT A SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST 24 
CONCLUSION 25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 26 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
State of Utah v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61 1 
Statev. Amirkhizi, 2004 UT App 324, 100 P.3d 225 24 
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699 14,15 
State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App. 107 25 
State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, 1,2 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,63 P.3d 650 11, 12,16,17,18,19,20,21 
State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App. 101,68 P.3d 1043 12,13,22 
Statev. Warren,2003 UT36, 78 P.3d 590 2,14,15,16,22 
Statutes and Constitutional Authorities 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 14 2,3,8,11 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-46 4 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-62(1) 4 
UtahCodeAnn. §41-6a-526 2,3,13,22,25 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-24 4,5,21 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2001) 1 
JURISDICTION. 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the police officer's request to search Gutierrez's person violate 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution because it exceeded, without reasonable 
suspicion, the scope and purpose of the traffic stop? 
Standard Of Review: "In search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to . . . 
the district court regarding the application of law to underling factual findings." State of 
Utah v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, j^8. Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed for 
correctness. State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, ^ 5. 
Issue No. 2: Did the police officer's Terry Frisk of Gutierrez violate Article I, § 
14 of the Utah Constitution where he lacked reasonable suspicion that Gutierrez was 
armed and presently dangerous? 
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed for 
correctness. State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, % 5. 
Issue No. 3: Did Gutierrez consent to the search of his person where his consent 
was not voluntary and it resulted from Officer Gerfen's exploitation of Gutierrez's illegal 
detention? 
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed for 
correctness. State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, f 5. 
Issue No. 4: Was the trial court's factual conclusion finding the beer bottle in 
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Gutierrez's car contained alcohol clearly erroneous when the record is void of any 
evidence that the bottle still contained beer at the time of its discovery? 
Standard of Review: The finding of facts underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,112, 78 P.3d 590, 
Issue No, 5: Was the search of Gutierrez incident to a lawful arrest for an open 
container violation when the statute only applies to containers that contain an alcoholic 
beverage and there is no evidence that the beer bottle discovered in Gutierrez's car still 
contained beer? 
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed for 
correctness. State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, f 5. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND ORDINENCES. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 14, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526, 
Drinking alcoholic beverages and open containers in motor vehicle 
prohibited - Definitions - Exceptions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the same meaning as defined in Section 32A-
1-105. 
(b) "Charted bus" has the same meaning as defined in Section 3 2A-1-105. 
(c) "Limousine" has the same meaning as defined in Section 32A-1-105. 
(d)(i) "Passenger Compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally 
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occupied by the operator and passengers. 
(ii) "Passenger Compartment" includes areas accessible to the operator 
and passengers while traveling, including a utility or glove compartment. 
(iii) "Passenger Compartment" does not include a separate front or rear 
trunk compartment or other area of the vehicle not accessible to the 
operator or passengers while inside the vehicle. 
(2) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a 
motor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle 
is moving stopped, or parked on a highway. 
(3) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to 
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains 
any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or 
the contents of the container partially consumed. 
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to a passenger: 
(a) in the living quarters of a motor home or camper; 
(b) who has carried an alcoholic beverage onto a limousine or charted 
bus that is in compliance with subsections 32A-12-213(3)(b) and (c); or 
(c) in a motorboat or on waters of this state as these terms are defined in 
Section 73-18-2. 
(5) Subsection (3) does not apply to passengers traveling in a licensed 
taxicab or bus. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature Of The Case, 
Gutierrez appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence under 
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. This case, at is essence, questions whether the 
police violated Gutierrez's rights as guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 when, following 
a traffic stop, the police requested consent to search Gutierrez without reasonable 
suspicion that he was armed or dangerous, or otherwise possessed contraband on his 
person. During the search the police discovered a pipe with methamphetamine residue 
inside the hooded sweatshirt worn by Gutierrez. 
The State contends that at each phase of the encounter, from the traffic stop to the 
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seizure of contraband, the police acted with reasonable suspicion, or in the alternative the 
search was incident to a valid arrest, Gutierrez contends the police request to search his 
person for anything illegal impermissibly deviated from the original purpose of the traffic 
stop without reasonable suspicion that Gutierrez was armed and dangerous, or otherwise 
possessed contraband. 
Course Of The Proceedings Below, 
Gutierrez was charged with "Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance in a 
drug free zone" a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 
"Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a drug free zone" a class A misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann, § 58-37a-5(l), "Speeding" a class C misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46, and "Following Too Close" a class C 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62(1). (Information, R. 1-2). A 
preliminary hearing was held on June 1, 2005. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, R. 118). 
Officer Gerfen was the only witness called to testify by the State. (Id.) Followint the 
preliminary hearing Gutierrez was bound over by the trial court. (Id. at 7:17-22). 
Gutierrez subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence challenging the search 
of his person by Officer Gerfen. (Motion to Suppress, R. 36-40). In his motion Gutierrez 
raided two issues. First, the search of his person violated both the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution because at 
moment Officer Gerfen requested consent to search he exceeded the scope of the traffic 
stop. (Mot.Suppress, R. 37). Second, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-24 precluded the State 
from availing itself of the inevitable discovery doctrine. (Id.) A hearing on the motion 
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was held on August 15, 2005. (Motion to Supress Hearing Transcript, R. 120). At the 
conclusion of the hearing the trial court issued its oral ruling from the bench finding 
Gutierrez consented to the search of his person, and the discovery of the 
methamphetamine rendered Gutierrez's argument under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-24 moot. 
(Prelim. Tr., R. 120, at 8:22-25,9:4-18). 
The State, at the request of the trial court, prepared the proposed findings of facts 
and conclusions of law. Gutierrez objected to the findings as exceeding the scope of the 
trial court's oral ruling because they also claimed the search was incident to a lawful 
arrest. ( Objection to Findings of Facts, R. 54). In a subsequent memorandum decision 
the trial court overruled Gutierrez's objection ruling that the proposed findings 
comported with its prior oral ruling. (Memorandum Decision 10/17/05, R. 61). The trial 
court subsequently signed the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law ("Findings of 
Facts") as prepared by the State. (Findings of Fact, R. 63-65). Gutierrez then filed a 
motion for rehearing on the motion to suppress to specifically address the trial court's 
conclusion that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. (Motion for Rehearing, R. 68-
69). The trial court denied the motion for rehearing. (Id.) 
Gutierrez then filed a petition for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals 
subsequently issued an order denying Gutierrez permission to appeal the trial court denial 
of his motion to suppress. (Utah Court of Appeals Order, R. 78). On March 27, 2006 
Gutierrez entered conditional guilty pleas to one count of "Illegal Possession of a 
Controlled Substance," a third degree felony and "Use or Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. (Minute Entry 3/27/06, R. 89). Gutierrez, 
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pursuant to his plea agreement with the State, preserved his right to challenge the denial 
of his motion to suppress. Sentence was imposed against Gutierrez on May 9, 2006. (R. 
106-109). On June 8, 2006, Gutierrez filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 104). 
Disposition In The Court Below. 
The trial court denied Gutierrez's motion to suppress. It determined that the initial 
traffic stop was legal and premised on observed traffic violations. Once the officers 
observed the open container of alcohol in the vehicle they had the right to determine if 
Gutierrez was impaired. The request to search was therefore legitimate because it 
occuixed during the period the officers were entitled to investigate the open container 
violation and because consent was granted. After the denial of his motion to suppress 
Gutierrez entered a conditional plea of guilty thereby preserving his right to appeal his 
motion. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Brigham City Police Officer Travis Gerfen (Officer Gerfen) observed Gutierrez 
traveling southbound in Brigham City, Utah. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr, R. 118, at 2:18-25, 3:6-8). 
To Officer Gerfen it appeared Gutierrez was following a second vehicle too close. (Id. at 
3:8-10). After following Gutierrez a short distance Officer Gerfen used his radar to 
determine he was traveling 52 mph in a 35 mph zone. (Id. at 3:10-13). Based on the 
speeding violation Officer Gerfen initiated a traffic stop of Gutierrez. (Id. at 3:13). The 
traffic stop occurred across the street from the Brigham City Police department during 
daytime hours. (Id. at 3:19). 
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Officer Gerfen approached Gutierrez from the drivers side window and requested 
and obtained a valid drivers license and registration from Gutierrez. (Id at 3:20-21, 5:1-
9). At about this same a second officer arrived to assist Officer Gerfen. (Id. at 21-22). 
The second officer approached the passenger side window and told Officer Gerfen that he 
could see an open bottle of beer by the drivers side window. (Id. at 21-24). Officer 
Gerfen instructed Gutierrez to exit the car 0 4 at 3:24-25). Officer Gerfen than asked 
Gutierrez if he was drinking. (Id. at 3:25). According to Officer Gerfen, Gutierrez 
admitted to having one beer. (Id. at 4:2) 
On cross examination Officer Gerfen acknowledged that he did not administer 
field sobriety tests to Gutierrez because did not appear intoxicated. (Id. at 5:24-25, 6:1, 4-
6). He also acknowledged that there was no reason to arrest him for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. (Id. at 6:2-3). And Officer Gerfen did not offer any evidence that he 
smelled alcohol on either Gutierrez's or his passenger. 
Because Gutierrez admitted to drinking, Officer Gerfen asked him if he could 
search his person for anything illegal. (Id. at 4:4-5). During the search Officer Gerfen 
he found a methamphetamine pipe inside a stocking cap that he removed from Gutierrez 
sweatshirt. (Id.) Officer Gerfen then arrested Gutierrez for possession of 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. (Id. at 4:9-10). 
Officer Gerfen, when asked on cross-examination why he wanted to search 
Gutierrez, explained, "If I pull somebody out on a traffic stop, if they've been drinking or 
if I believe they9 re in the process of committing a crime, I'll search them if they give me 
permission." (Id. at 519-23). Officer Gerfen also acknowledged that he could not recall if 
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he returned Gutierrez's license and registration before requesting consent to search him. 
(Id at 7-11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Officer Gerfen violated Gutierrez right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures as guaranteed by Article I, § 14 when he asked Gutierrez if he could search his 
persons. The discovery of the beer bottle in Gutierrez car, following a valid traffic stop, 
created a reasonable suspicion that Gutierrez was intoxicated or had violated the open 
container statue. Officer Gerfen, however, was constitutionally obligated to pursue a 
means of investigation that would quickly confirm or dispel these possible criminal 
violations. The request to search Gutierrez, however, fell outside his expanded authority 
to investigate. Officer Gerfen simply lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Gutierrez was armed and dangerous, that he had an open container on his person, or that 
the search would otherwise disclose information that would diligently confirm or dispels 
any concern that Gutierrez was intoxicated or violated the open container statute. 
The search of Gutierrez was also not a valid search under the Terry Doctrine. A 
traditional Terry frisk required Officer Gerfen to have a reasonable articulable suspicion 
that Gutierrez was armed or dangerous. There is no evidence in the record, however, to 
support this conclusion. Instead, by Officer Gerfen's own admission, he requested 
consent to search as a matter of practice rather than any particular concern or belief that 
Gutierrez was concealing a weapon. 
Gutierrez's consent to search was obtained through duress and coercion and the 
exploitation of Officer Gerfen's prior illegal conduct. Under the totality of the 
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circumstances the State cannot meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Gutierrez's consent was voluntary. Gutierrez was never informed that he 
could refuse the request. At the time the request was made Officer Gerfen still possessed 
Gutierrez's drivers license and registration so that he was not free to leave. And the 
request was made immediately after Gutierrez was ordered out of the car. Taken together 
the State cannot prove Gutierrez will was not overborne or his capacity for self 
determination was not critically impaired. 
Furthermore, Gutierrez's consent was obtained through Officer Gerfen 
exploitation of the illegal detention. When conducting an exploitation analysis the court 
evaluates the relationship between the police misconduct and the illegally obtained 
evidence to determine if excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities. 
Officer Gerfen admitted that it is his practice to ask for consent to search whenever he 
removes a driver from their vehicle regardless of his constitutional obligation to strictly 
tie his investigatory questioning to the facts and circumstances that justified the stop in 
the first place. This demonstrates that Officer Gerfen engages in the illegal questioning 
for the primary purpose of exploiting his misconduct to gain consent to search. Officer 
Gerfen's purpose of exploiting his misconduct also demonstrates a direct connection 
between his misconduct and Gutierrez's consent. Suppressing the evidence derived from 
the illegal detention would serve to deter future misconduct. In addition the record is 
void of any intervening circumstances that created a clean break between the chain of 
events connecting the misconduct to Gutierrez's consent. Finally, the temporal proximity 
between the illegal detention and Gutierrez's consent was negligible and strongly 
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indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to 
dissipate. 
The trial court's finding that the beer bottle contained alcohol was clearly 
erroneous. The only facts entered into the record regarding the beer bottle were provided 
by Officer Gerfen. They included to three specific facts, (1) Officer Gerfen learned from 
an assisting officer that there was an open beer bottle on the drivers side, (2) the assisting 
officer observed the bottle while standing next to the passenger side window, (3) Officer 
Gerfen stated that "if he had an open container in his vehicle, I generally don't write 
citations for that." In contrast, there is no evidence that Officer Gerfen attempted to 
examine the bottle to determine if it was empty or it contained alcohol. Gutierrez was 
never cited for an open container violation. Officer Gerfen did not claim he smelled 
alcohol on either Gutierrez or his passenger's breath. Gutierrez did not appear 
intoxicated and he was not subjected to field sobriety tests. Finally, Officer Gerfen stated 
that his decision to arrest Gutierrez stemmed from the illegal discovery of 
methamphetamine and not from the beer bottle discovered in the car. 
Finally, the search of Gutierrez was not a search incident to a valid arrest. To fall 
within this exception to the warrant requirement the State has the burden of proving (1) 
the arrest was lawful, (2) the search was in the area of the suspect's immediate control, 
and (3) the search was contemporaneous to the arrest. Gutierrez concedes that the State 
can satisfy the second and third prongs. The real question in this case is if the arrest of 
Gutierrez was lawful. The op^n container statute prohibits the transportation of an 
alcoholic container if it still contains alcohol, the container has been opened, its seal 
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broken, or the contents partially consumed. In this case there is no evidence in the record 
to suggest Officer Gerfeti examined the beer bottle to determine if any of its contents 
remained! As noted above he did not claim to detect odor on the bream of either 
Gutierrez or his passenger. Gutierrez did not appear intoxicated, and there was no 
evidence that Officer Gerfen observed any physical indications that either individual was 
drinking beer in the car. 
The above considerations establish that Officer Gerfen violated Gutierrez rights 
guaranteed by Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. The Court of Appeals must reverse 
the trial court's denial of Gutierrez motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OFFICER GERFEN'S REQUEST TO SEARCH GUTIERREZ 
VIOLATED ARTICLE L S14 BECAUSE IT EXCEEDED, WITHOUT 
REASONABLE SUSPICION, THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE 
TRAFFIC STOP. 
Article I, Section 14 provides, "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall no be 
violated;..." Utah Const. Article I, Section. 14. This right prohibits a police officer 
from stopping a vehicle unless he has reasonable suspicion the driver has committed a 
crime. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650. Once a traffic stop is made the 
officers authority to question the driver must remain tightly moored to the conduct that 
justified the stop in the first place. Id. at f 29. This means the officer's investigatory 
authority is strictly limited to requesting a valid drivers license and registration, 
conducting a warrants check, and issuing a citation. Id. at 31. The officer must then 
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allow the driver to depart. Id. Any investigation beyond the original purpose of the 
traffic stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity. Id. 
Absent new evidence the expanded investigation is illegal. Id. 
Even when faced with additional evidence of criminal activity the police are 
constitutionally obligated to diligently pursue a means of investigation that quickly 
confirms or dispels the officer's new suspicions. State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App. 101, f 
14, 68 P.3d 1043. The new investigation must further remain strictly tied to the facts and 
circumstances giving rise to the officer new suspicions. Id. Failure to do so renders the 
expanded investigation illegal. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31. 
A traffic violation committed in presence of a police officer is a constitutionally 
sufficient basis for stopping a driver. Id. at 30. In the present case Officer Gerfen stopped 
Gutierrez for speeding. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:10-13). Once Officer Gerfen 
observed the traffic violation he possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop 
Gutierrez. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, <f 30. His authority to seize and detain Gutierrez, 
however, was strictly limited to performing those acts necessary to request a valid 
driver's license and registration, conduct a warrants check and issue the citation for the 
observed traffic violations. Id. at % 31. Shortly after the traffic stop, however, an assisting 
officer noticed a beer bottle inside the vehicle. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:21-24). 
This newly observed evidence expanded Officer Gerfen's authority and permitted him to 
investigate both the presence of the container and whether Gutierrez was driving while 
intoxicated. 
Officer Gerfen, however, was constitutionally obligated to pursue a means of 
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investigation that would quickly dispel or confirm whether Gutierrez violated the open 
container statue or whether he was driving while intoxicated. State v. Lafond, 2003 UT 
App. 101, % 14 Officer Gerfen nevertheless ignored his constitutional obligations and 
instead immediately asked Gutierrez if he could search his person. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 
118, at 3: 21-25,4:1-5). Later during the preliminary hearing, when asked why, Officer 
Gerfen simply explained, "if I pull somebody out of a traffic stop, if they've been 
drinking or if I believe they're in the process of committing a crime, I search them if they 
give me permission to." (Id. at 5:19-23). By Officer Gerfen's own admission his request 
to search was made as a matter of general practice and not because of some reasonable 
articulable concern that Gutierrez possessed contraband, or posed a threat to Officer 
Gerfen's safety. 
The absence of reasonable articulable suspicion is further illuminated by the 
totality of facts and circumstance confronting Officer Gerfen, and his reaction to those 
facts. Regarding any fear that Gutierrez was driving while intoxicated, Officer Gerfen 
admitted in his testimony that he did not administer field sobriety tests to Gutierrez 
because he did not appear intoxicated. (Id at 6:1-6). 
Confronted with a possible open container violation, Officer Gerfen did nothing to 
diligently dispel or confirm that concern. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526, the 
open container statute, " a person may not keep, carry, possess, transport... in the 
passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any 
container which contains any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its 
seal broken, or the contents of the container partially consumed. Id. at (3)(emphasis 
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added). The statue, when read as a whole, requires that the container actually contain 
alcohol and it does not prohibit the transportation of empty beer bottles, cans or other 
empty alcohol containers. To construe the statue otherwise would cause undesired results 
such as dissuading the collection of litter, or the recycling of bottles and cans. 
In his testimony Officer Gerfen admitted to learning of the beer bottle from an 
assisting officer, who in turn observed the bottle in the driver side compartment while 
standingat the passenger side window. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:19-24). There is 
nothing in the record, however, that demonstrates Officer Gerfen, or the assisting officer, 
examined the bottle to determine if it contained alcohol. Instead, Officer Gerfen 
immediately asked Gutierrez if he could search his person. (Id. at 3:24-25). Yet the 
record is void of any facts articulated by Officer Gerfen that explain how searching 
Gutierrez would assist him in determining whether he violated the open container statue. 
n. OFFICER GERFEN5 SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS NOT 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE TERRY DOCTRINE BECAUSE HE 
LACKED REASONABLE SUSPCION THAT GUTIERREZ WAS 
ARMED OR OTHEWISE POSED A THREAT TO OFFICER 
SAEFTY. 
Officer Gerfen's search of Gutierrez was not justified under the Terry Doctrine. 
"Traditional Terry Frisk requires that the officer have reasonable, articulable suspicion 
the suspect is armed and dangerous." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 32,103 P.3d 699. 
The Terry Doctrine grew from the need to balance society's interest in promoting officer 
safety against its interest in protecting individual liberty from arbitrary police actions. 
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 25, 78 P.3d 590. There is, without doubt, an inherent 
danger in all traffic stops. Id. at f 23. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged, however, 
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this "danger can be fully or partially mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the 
vehicle." Id. at f 22. This slight intrusion on individual liberty, even in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion, is justified in order to allow the police officer to operate in safety. 
A£ at m 24-25. 
In contrast, "a Terry frisk is an intrusion of greater magnitude" that "may inflict 
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly." Id. at 
f 25. A Terry frisk is therefore prohibited unless the police officer possesses reasonable 
articulable facts that "lead a reasonable person to believe the suspect may be armed and 
presently dangerous." Id. at ^ 29. In Brake the Utah Supreme Court further explained 
that for crimes "such as trafficking in small quantities of narcotics, possession of 
marijuana, underage drinking, driving under the influence and lesser traffic offenses . . . 
there must be particular facts that lead the officer to believe the suspect is armed." State 
v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 32 (quoting State v. Warren, 2001 UT App. 346, f 15, 37 P.3d 
270). 
Applying these principles to the present case, the record clearly shows Officer 
Gerfen's search of Gutierrez was not justified. Gutierrez was stopped for minor traffic 
violations and upon the discovery of the beer bottle was immediately ordered out of his 
vehicle. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:21-25). Any inherent danger of the traffic stop 
itself was at least partially, if not fully, mitigated by Gutierrez exit from his car. State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 22 
Once Gutierrez was outside his car the nature of the crimes required Officer 
Gerfen to have particular facts that would lead him to believe Gutierrez was armed and 
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presently dangerous. Id. at f^ 29. The record is void of the required facts. Instead Officer 
Gerfen explained that his desire to search Gutierrez was based solely on Gutierrez's 
admission to drinking a beer. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 4:4-5). Officer Gerfen also 
testified that the focus of his search was not weapons but "anything illegal" Gutierrez 
might possess. (Id.) 
Absent from the record is also any indication that Gutierrez was acting aggressive 
or threatening. There is no allegation that Officer Gerfen noticed any weapons in the car, 
or any bulge or object on Gutierrez's person that suggested he possessed a weapon of any 
kind. When considered with the fact that the traffic stop occurred across the street from 
the Brigham City Police Station during daylight hours, Officer Gerfen simply had no 
basis to form a reasonable articulable suspicion that Gutierrez was armed and presently 
dangerous. (Id at 3:19-20). 
It instead appears that Officer Gerfen engaged in a pattern and practice of asking 
consent to search the drivers during his traffic stops. When asked why he wanted to 
search Gutierrez, Officer Gerfen explained, "if I pull somebody out on a traffic stop, if 
they've been drinking or I believe they are in the process of committing a crime, I'll 
always search them if they give me permission to." (Id, at 5:21-25). This practice was 
specifically rejected by the Utah Supreme Court as impermissible investigative 
questioning the unconstitutionally expanded the scope of the traffic stop. State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125,132, 63 P.3d 650. 
In Hansen the arresting officer stopped Hansen for an illegal lane change and lack 
of insurance. Id. at f 6. Once the officer determined that Hansen's drivers license and 
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registration were current he returned the documents to Hansen with a warning to obtain 
car insurance. Id. at % 12. Before letting Hansen leave, however, the officer asked him if 
"he had any alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the car." Id. at % 13. When Hansen replied 
"no" the officer asked permission to search the vehicle. Id. During the motion to 
suppress hearing the officer conceded he lacked reasonable suspicion that Hansen was 
committing some additional crime. Id. at ^ 32. The officer instead admitted, "it's my 
practice to ask them for consent" to search the car. Id at f 14. On review the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that once the officer started questioning Hansen about alcohol 
and drugs the officer had "exceeded, without justification, the purpose of the initial traffic 
stop." Id. at % 32. Hansen's continued detention was subsequently illegal. Id. 
III. GUTIERREZ DID NOT CONSENT TO THE SEARCH, 
Valid consent requires that (1) the consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the 
consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegal detention. Id. at f 47. 
Ruling on Gutierrez's motion to suppress the trial court concluded that Gutierrez 
consented to the search by Officer Gerfen. The question of voluntary consent is a legal 
conclusion reviewed for correctness. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 51. Similarly, 
determining if consent was obtained by exploiting the prior illegal detention is a legal 
conclusion that is also reviewed for correctness. Id. at 61. 
A. Gutierrez's Consent Was Not Voluntary, 
"When the State attempts to prove that there was voluntary consent after an illegal 
detention, it has a much heavier burden to satisfy then when consent is given after a 
permissible detention. Id. at % 51. Relying on the totality of the circumstances the State 
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must prove voluntary consent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. f 56. This requires 
the State to prove Gutierrez consented without duress or coercion, that his will was not 
overborne or his capacity for self determination was not critically impaired. Id. at f 57. 
Duress or coercion may be demonstrated by a defendant's low intelligence, 
evidence of minimal school, lack of any effective warnings about his rights and the 
timing of the requests to search. Id. A lack of duress or coercion may be demonstrated by 
(1) the absence of a claim of authority, (2) the absence of an exhibition of force, (3) a 
mere request to search, (4) cooperation by the defendant* (5) the absence of deception or 
trick by the officer. Id. 
Applying these factors, Gutierrez did not receive any warnings about his right to 
refuse the search. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 4:4-5). The request was made 
immediately after he was ordered out of the car. (Id. at 3:24-25,4:1-5). This timing 
strongly implied he was not free to refuse the officer's request to search. At the time the 
request was made, Officer1 Gerfren still had Gutierrez's drivers license and registration in 
his possession. (Id. at 4:25, 5:1-9, 6:7-16). By retaining these documents Officer Gerfen 
demonstrated force and authority over Gutierrez since he was not otherwise free to leave. 
Officer Gerfen's authority to prohibit Gutierrez from leaving also implied the authority 
require Gutierrez to remain at the scene until he gave consent to search. 
On the other hand, there is no indication in the record that Officer Gerfen used 
deception or trickery to gain consent. Gutierrez is seemingly a person of average 
intelligence with a more than minimal schooling. There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest the request to search was anything more than a request. Nevertheless, the State, 
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in consideration of the totality of the circumstances, cannot prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Gutierrez's consent was voluntary. 
B. Gutierrez's Consent Resulted From The Police Exploitation Of His 
Illegal Detention, 
"When conducting an exploitation analysis, a court evaluates the relationship 
between official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if 
excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities." State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, f 62. The purpose is to "compel respect for the constitutional guaranty . . . by 
removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. 
Relevant factors include "(1) the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct, (2) 
the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the temporal proximity between the 
illegal detention and consent." Id at f 64. "The purpose and flagrancy factor directly 
relates to the deterrent value of the suppression." Id. at % 65 "The need for deterrence is 
strongest where criminal sanctions against the defendant may result." Id. at f 63. When 
an officer engages in illegal conduct for the purpose of obtaining consent then 
suppression of the illegally obtained evidence will clearly have a deterrent effective. Id. 
atf 65. 
Applying these considerations in Hansen, the Supreme Court concluded the 
officer's overriding "purpose of the illegal detention was to exploit the opportunity to ask 
for consent." Id at f 66. Similarly, Officer Gerfen admitted that it is his practice to ask 
for consent to search whenever he removes a driver from his vehicle. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., 
R. 118, at 5:21-23). He employed this practice against Gutierrez and requested consent 
10 
to search even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. These facts demonstrate that, like 
the officer in Hansen, Officer Gerfen engages in the illegal detention for the primary 
purpose of exploiting the opportunity in order to gain consent. 
In Hansen the Supreme Court also concluded that the officer's objective to exploit 
the illegal detention demonstrated a direct connection between the officer's misconduct 
and Hansen's consent. Id. The Court further noted that 'the incentive present in this case 
to violate constitutional guarantees is precisely the type of incentive that must be 
removed." Id. ^ 67. Again the parallels between Officer Gerfen's conduct and the 
Hansen case are strong. Officer's Gerfen's objective to exploit the illegal detention 
demonstrates a direct connection between the purpose underlying his misconduct and 
Gutierrez's consent. Suppressing the evidence derived from Officer Gerfen's misconduct 
will have a deterrent effect on him and his fellow officers. See, Id. at f^ 67. 
Additionally there were no intervening factors between Officer Gerfen's 
misconduct and Gutierrez's consent. To cure the misconduct, intervening factors require 
some occurrence that creates a clean break in the chain of events connecting the 
misconduct to Gutierrez's consent. See, Id. at f^ 68. In this instance, however, Officer 
Gerfen obtained consent on the heels of his misconduct, and the record is void of any 
intervening circumstance. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:21-25, 4:1-7). 
The final consideration is the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and 
consent. "A brief time lapse between the [constitutional] violation and consent often 
indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to 
dissipate." Id. at f 69. In Hansen the Supreme Court noted that the "lapse of time was 
negligible" because the illegal detention started when the officer questioned Hansen 
about drugs in his vehicle and was immediately followed by the request for and the 
granting of consent. Id. Similarly, the illegal detention of Gutierrez started when Officer 
Gerfen, without reasonable suspicion, asked Gutierrez if he could search his person. 
Gutierrez immediately granted permission rendering the time lapse between the 
misconduct and the consent negligible and insufficient to allow the taint of Officer 
Gerfen's misconduct to dissipate. 
Based on the purpose behind Officer Gerfen's misconduct, the lack of intervening 
circumstances, and the negligible temporal proximity between the misconduct and 
consent, the consent to search granted by Gutierrez resulted from the Officer Gerfen's 
exploitation of his prior illegality. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING OFFICER'S GERFEN'S 
SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS INCIDENT TO A VALID 
ARREST. 
In its Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter "Findings") the trial 
court ruled Officer Gerfen's search of Gutierrez was a valid search incident to an arrest. 
(Finding of Facts, R. 64, at % 1). Gutierrez objected to this portion of the Findings 
because the trial court oral's ruling did not address that issue. (Objection to Finding of 
Facts Conclusion of Law, R. 54, at f 2). As demonstrated by the record, the trial court 
only addressed the issues of consent to search and whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-24 
prohibited Officer Gerfen from arresting Gutierrez. (Supp. Hr'g Tr., R, 120, at 8:22-25, 
9:6-18). On the first issue it ruled Gutierrez consented to the search. (Id. at 8:22-25). It 
then ruled the second issue was rendered moot by the discovery of drugs. (Id. at 9:6-18) 
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The trial court nevertheless issued a memorandum decision overruling Gutierrez's 
objections and entered the finding of facts and conclusions of law as proposed by the 
State. (Mem. Decision, R. 61-62; Finding of Facts, R. 63-65). The Finding of Facts 
proposed by the State provided the first instance wherein the trial court addressed the 
State's claim the search was incident to a valid arrest. 
A. The Trial Court's Committed Clear Error When It Found The Beer 
Bottle In Gutierrez's Car Contained Alcohol. 
The findings of fact underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 
f 12. As discussed below the trial court's sole basis for concluding the search was 
incident to a lawful arrest is the alleged open container violation. (Finding of Facts, R. 
63-65). Probable cause to arrest Gutierrez for this violation could only exist, however, if 
there was a reasonable basis to believe the beer bottle actually contained alcohol. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526 the possession or transportation of an alcoholic beverage in 
a motor vehicle is only prohibited if the container has alcohol in it, it has been opened, or 
its seal broken, or the contents partially consumed. Id. at (3). The statue, read as a whole, 
does not prohibit the transportation of empty beer bottles, cans or other empty alcohol 
containers. To construe the statute otherwise would cause undesired results such as 
dissuading the collection of litter, or the recycling of bottles and cans. 
The only facts entered into the record regarding the beer bottle were provided by 
Officer Gerfen when he testified at the preliminary hearing. His testimony, however, was 
limited to three specific facts: (1) Officer Gerfen learned there was an open beer bottle on 
9? 
the drivers side of the vehicle from an assisting officer; (2) the assisting officer observed 
the beer bottle from the passenger side window; (3) Officer Gerfen's statement in 
reference to Gutierrez that, "If he had an open beer container in his vehicle, I generally 
don't write citations for that." (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:21-24,6:25,7:1-3). 
A police officer, when confronted with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
beyond the original purpose of the traffic stop, is obligated to pursue a course of 
investigation that quickly confirms or dispels his suspicions. Lafond, 2003 UT App. 101, 
*! 14. Yet, there is no indication in the record that Officer Gerfen pursued any 
investigation at all. The record instead shows that he immediately used this information 
as an opportunity to gain consent to search Gutierrez. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, 3;21-25, 
4:1-7). Without this investigation the trial court was left without a sufficient factual basis 
to conclude the beer bottle observed in Gutierrez car contained alcohol. 
Conversely, there is substantial evidence that undermines the trial court's finding. 
The record clearly shows that Officer Gerfen never cited Gutierrez for an open container 
violation. (Id. at 6:12-14). Nor was he charged with that crime by the State. (Information, 
R. 1). There is nothing in the record to suggest Officer Gerfen ever examined the beer 
bottle to determine whether it was empty or contained alcohol. There is no evidence in 
the record to suggest that either Officer Gerfen or the assisting officer observed the smell 
of alcohol on either Gutierrez or his passenger. The scent of alcohol on either person 
would help support a belief that one or the other was drinking beer from the bottle found 
in the car. Although Gutierrez admitted to previously drinking a beer there is nothing in 
the record to establish its temporal proximity to the traffic stop. Gutierrez was never 
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subjected to field sobriety tests despite the discovery of the beer bottle. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., 
R. 118, at 6:4-6). When Officer Gerfen was asked on cross examination why he did not 
administer field sobriety tests he explained the Gutierrez did not appear intoxicated. (Id.) 
Officer Gerfen also explained that his decision to arrest Gutierrez stemmed from the 
discovery of the methamphetamine and not from the beer bottle. (Id. at 4:9-12). When 
viewed under the totality of the circumstances the facts, including all reasonable 
inference, fail to support the trial court's conclusion the bottle found in Gutierrez's car 
contained beer. 
V. OFFICER GERFEN'S SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS NOT A 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST, 
The trial court's legal conclusion that the search of Gutierrez was a search incident 
to a lawful arrest is reviewed correctness. To fall within this exception to the warrant 
requirement the State has the burden of proving (1) the arrest was lawful, (2) the search 
was in the area of the suspect's immediate control, and (3) the search is conducted 
contemporaneously to the arrest. State v. Amirkhizi, 2004 UT App 324, f 16, 100 P.3d 
225. 
Gutierrez concedes that the second and third prongs of the tests are satisfied. 
After all, the search was of his person and occurred almost immediately after the 
discovery of the beer bottle. The true question in this case is whether the beer bottle 
observed in Gutierrez's vehicle formed a lawful basis for arresting him. It did not. For a 
wanantless arrest to be lawful it must be supported by probable cause. Probable cause in 
turn requires facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to 
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warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing the suspect has or is 
currently committing a crime. State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App. 107, % 11. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526, " a person may not keep, carry, possess, 
transport... in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any 
highway, any container which contains any alcoholic beverage if the container has been 
opened, its seal broken, or the contents of the container partially consumed. Id. at 
(3)(emphasis added). Probable cause to arrest Guiterrez for an open container required 
Officer Gerfen to have within his knowledge facts and circumstance that would lead a 
prudent officer to believe the beer bottle actually contained beer. 
Nothing in the record suggests that Officer Gerfen ever examined the bottle to 
determine if any of its contents remained. There is nothing in the record to suggest the 
bottle contained liquid in any form. As noted above Officer Gerfen admitted that 
Gutierrez did not appear intoxicated. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 6:4-6). There is no 
allegation that he smelled alcohol on either Gutierrez's or his passenger's breath or 
observed any other physical indication that either was drinking while driving in 
Gutierrez's car. Because Officer Gerfen failed to determine if the bottle still contained 
beer he lacked the probable cause to conclude Gutierrez violated Utah open container 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Gutierrez respectfully request an order from the Utah 
Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 9th day of November 2006. 
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UGR/Ji DISTRICT COURTS 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALFREDO MUNOZ GUTIERREZ 
228 W. 100 N. Apt. 4 




Court Case #: 
Judge: 
The undersigned, as prosecuting attorney states on information and belief that 
the above-named defendant, in Box Elder County, State of Utah, committed the 
following crime(s): 
COUNT 1 ^ 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ( c f c ) (559), a sepejfid 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), as follows: That Alfredo 
Munoz Gutierrez on or about March 6, 2005, did knowingly and intentionally possess or 
use a controlled substance, to wit, methamphetamine, and committed the-offonsc within 
i^ a thousand feet of a cchool, churoh, or public parking lot. J/. 
COUNT 2 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA (DFZ) (1269), a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(1), as follows: That Alfredo Munoz Gutierrez 
on or about March 6, 2005, did knowingly, intentionally or recklessly use, or possess 
with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, 
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body. Furthermore, the defendant committed the offense 
within a thousand feet of a school, church, or public parking lot. 
COUNT 3 
SPEEDING (108), a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46, as 
follows: That Alfredo Munoz Gutierrez on or about March 6, 2005, did operate a vehicle 
at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions, giving regard 
to the actual and potential hazards then existing, to wit: 57 miles per hour in a 35 miles 
per hour zone. 
COUNT 4 
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE (50), a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-62(1), as follows: That Alfredo Munoz Gutierrez on or about March 6, 2005, did 
follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for 
the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: Cpl. 
Travis Gerfen. 
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THE CLERK: Case number 05110099, State of Utah 
versus Alfredo Gutierrez. Counsel, please state your names 
for the record. 
MR. SMITH: Brad Smith, State of Utah. 
MR. GRAVIS: Martin Gravis for the defendant, 
Alfredo Gutierrez. 
THE COURT: This is the time scheduled for a 
preliminary hearing. Are the parties ready to proceed? 
MR. SMITH: We are. 
MR. GRAVIS: The defense is ready, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may call your first witness. 
MR. SMITH: The state calls Officer Travis Gerfen. 
TRAVIS GERFEN, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q. Officer Gerfen, will you state your name for the record. 
A. Travis Gerfen. 
Q. And who are you employed by? 
A. Brigham City police department. 
Q. And what is your position with the Brigham City police 
department'? 
A. I'm a corporal on patrol. 








How do you know him? 
I conducted a traffic stop on March 6th, 2005. 
Could you describe what the circumstances of that stop 
were? 
A. I was on patrol. I was down by the north 7-Eleven 
between Main Street and First East. I saw a green Isuzu 
Rodeo traveling southbound. It appeared he was too close to 
ano 
and 
ther vehicle, so I pulled out on Main Street to get there 
see how close he was. By the time I turned onto Main 












same direction of travel as he was. He was going 52 
as per hour in a 35 and so I pulled him over. 
Okay. Wh$t happened when you pulled the vehicle over? 
He stopped. 
And who was driving the vehicle? 
It was Alfredo Gutierrez. 
Okay. 
He stopped right in front of the police department 
thbound on Main Street. I went up to him, talked to him, 
his information, driver!s license and registration. At 
t time Officer Panner showed up and he went up to the 
passenger side window and told me that he could see an open 
beer bottle by the driver's side. At that point I asked him 












did he say? 
he said he only had had one beer. 
happened next? 
ked him if I could search his person to see 
illegal, because he had been drinking. In 





was a methamphetamine pipe with residue. 
happened next? 
if he had 
his sweat 
inside 
I placed him under arrest for that, for the possession of 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Officer Panner g 




for his warrants. 
How did you recognize the methamphetamine in the 









And what did you do with the pipe? 
I took it to the police department and placed it 
dence 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Thank you. Thatfs all I 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
MR. GRAVIS: 
Was the residue, or whatever, in the pipe tested 









Now, you say you stopped Mr. Gutierrez and he gave 
Page 5 
you a valid driver's license, correct? 
A. I can't remember if he did or not. 
Q. You never gave him a ticket for no driver's license? 
A. I don't believe I did. 
Q. He gave you the registration and insurance and all that 
stuff, right? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. And everything appeared to be in order, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what address was on the driver's license? 
A. I don't remember that. I don't write that down 
generally. 
Q. Was it a local address? 
A. That I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Okay. Now, you say that the other officer saw a beer in 
the car and you asked Mr. Gutierrez if he'd been drinking and 
he said one beer, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You asked him to step out of the vehicle and then you 
asked to search him. Why did you want to search him? 
A. If I pull somebody out on a traffic stop, if they've been 
drinking or if I believe they're in the process of committing 
a crime, I'll search them if they give me permission to. 







He did not, no. 
So you had no reason to arrest him for 
I did not arrest him for DUI, no. 
DUI, correct? 
Okay. In fact, you never even asked him to do 
sobriety tests, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
He didn!t appear to be intoxicated. 
And at this time where was his paperwor 






I don't remember. 
He handed it to you. Had you given it 
I don't remember. 
Had you written him a citation at that 
k, his 1 
back to 
point in 
If I did, there isn't a copy of the citation in 
report. I don!t think I wrote a citation. 




That is correct. 
Okay. Prior to finding the pipe in his 
have any reason to believe that if you wrot 






Generally, if they have meth on them, I 
Prior to discovering that did you have 
ieve that if you wrote him a citation he 
court? 
If he had an open beer container in his 
jacket, 
e him a 







did you 1 
traffic 
oing to — 1 
any reason to 1 





generally donft write a citation for that. I usually 
(unintelligible) . So with that information alone, no, 'I 
wouldn't write him a citation. 
Q. You wouldn't write him a citation because he had an open 
container? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. So you would have arrested him, is what you're 
saying, and searched 










Okay. I have nothing further. 
Any redirect? 
No. 
You may step down. Your next witness. 
The state rests. 
We'll submit it, Your Honor. 1 
Based on the evidence presented at the 1 
the court finds that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant committed 1 
the offense of possession of a controlled substance within a 
thousand feet of a public facility, use or possession of drug 1 
paraphernalia, speed ing, and following a vehicle too closely. 
Therefore he'll be held to answer on those charges. 
He has the forma 
formal reading of th 
MR. GRAVIS: 
1 information there. Does he waive the J 
ose charges? 1 













and you can show it 





We can make a copy for you. 
him, but I think he had other 
Yes. I have police reports. 
the information. 
Let me go ahead and hand you 
to him. Ifll ask if he wants 
f those charges? 
One was 
counsel. 
, but I 
the file 
to waive 
We will waive the reading, Your Honor. 
All right. After the hearing, if you 
like, you can take the file downstairs and get a copy then. 





counts, how does the defendant plead? 
Not guilty. 
How much time would you like 






22 or July 5th. 
MR. GRAVIS: 
before we 
When is your next arraignment date, 
I can give you a pretrial on 
I know I can't do July 5th. 
June 22nd. What time, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: 
We'll see you then. 
(Hearing 
either June 
Let's do 1 
10:00 on June 22nd for a pretrial. 1 
concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the CD recorded hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 8, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box Elder 
County, Brigham City, Utah. 
Dated this 7th day of September, 2006. 
Cj^y^ 
Rodney MM Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
Tab 3 
EXHIBIT 3 
(Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support) 
MARTIN V. GRAVIS (#1237) 
ATTORNEY FOR ALFREDO GUTIERREZ 
2562 Washington Boulevard 
Odgen, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
Fax: (801) 334-7275 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 





MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
JUDGE BEN HADFIELD 
CASE No. 051100099 
COMES Now, Defendant, by and through his Attorney, Martin V. Gravis, and 
hereby moves the above entitled Court to Suppress statements of the defendant. This 
motion is based upon the 4TH and 14TH Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE DEFENDANT was driving a vehicle in Brigham City, Utah, on March 6, 2005 when he 
was stopped for violatio of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-46, speeding, and 41-6-55, following to 
close. After the officer stopped the defendant he saw an open bottle of beer by the passenger. The 
officer then asked the defendant for permission to search him but had no reason to believe the 
defendant had any open containers on him. The officer found the alleged contraband in a hat in 
the defendant's coat pocket. The officer then arrested the defendant and also charged him a 
violation of 41-6-44.20, open container. 
The offier testified that he did not remember if the defendant had a valid drivers license 
(he did) and where the defendant lived, (he lives in Brigham city). 
J?* I 7 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
CASE No. 051100099 
ARGUEMENT 
POINT I 
THE OFFICER exceeded the scope of the traffic stop by extending the stop to obtain 
consent to search the defendant, therefore the consent was illegally obtained as a result of the 
illegal detention and illegal. 
In State v. Godina-Luna 826 P2d.652 (Utah App. 1992), the Court said as follows: 
[3] Once a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, any detention for reasons 
exceeding the scope of the original stop and not reasonably related to the 
circumstances justifying the stop in the first place, is illegal. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Robinson, 
797 P.2d 431, 437-38 (Utah App. 1990). 
[4] In other words, "[t]he length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied 
to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761,763 (Utah 1991); (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-
20, 88 S. Ct. At 1879), Once the reasons for the initial stop have been satisfied, 
the individual *655 must be allowed to proceed on his or her way. "Any further 
temporary detention for ivestigative questioning after the fulfillment of the 
purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment only if 
the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity." 
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 
(10th Cir. 1998)). 
Since the officer's request to search the defendant was not related to the stop or even the 
open container and occurred prior to the issuance of any citation, it constitutes an illegal search 
because of the illegal detention of the defendant and the defendant's consent was obtained as a 
result of the officer's illegal act. 
POINT II 
The State cannot argue inevitable discovery since the officer could not have legally 
arrested the defendant for the open container violation. 
Title 41-6-166 says as follows: 
Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor- Setting bond. Whenever any 
person is arrested for any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, the arrested 
person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the following cases, be taken without 
unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is 
alleged to have been nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where said 
STATE OF UTAH VS. ALFREDO GUTIERREZ 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
CASE NO. 051100099 
arrest is made, in any of the following cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. 
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination 
thereof as prescribed in Section 41-6-44. 
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident 
causeing death, personal injuries, or damage to property. 
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to 
appear in court as herinafter provided, or when in the discretion of the arresting officer, a 
written promise to appear in insufficient. 
This statute has not been interpreted by the appellate courts but was raised in both the 
Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Harmon 654 P.2d 
1037 (Utah App. 1993) 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). The Appellate Courts determined in that 
case that since Harmon was for driving on suspension which is not an offense under 41-6-et.seq. 
that 41-6-166 did not apply but the Supreme Court did say as follows: 
These factors notwithstanding, we conclude that Harmon's arrest for driving on 
suspension was not unreasonable in light of the governmental interest in removing unlicensed 
drivers from the road for public safety reasons. Other jurisdictions have uniformly held that 
driving on suspension is sufficiently serious to justify the offender's arrest rather that mere 
detention and citation. See, e.g., State v. S.P., 580 S. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review 
denied, 592 So.2d 682 (1991); People v. Anderson, 169 111. App. 3d 289, 120 111. Dec. 123,129, 
523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040, appeal denied, 122 I11.2d 579, 125 Ill.Dec.223, 530 N.E.2d 251 (1988), 
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cert. Denied, 490 U.S. 1036, 109 S.Ct. 1935, 194 L.Ed.2d 407 (1989); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 
184, 642 A.2d947, 958 (1994) (upholding arrest in part because driving on suspension "poses 
grave danger to the public"); State v. Hollis. 161 Vt. 87, 633 A.2d 1362.1364 (1993); State v. 
Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 835 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1992) (overruling prior contrary authority). 
[fii.10] Harmon has not identified, and we have not found, a single case where an arrest for 
driving on suspension has been held to be unconstitutional. 
This holding should be construed narrowly and does not necessarily apply to other traffic 
violations. "It should be the policy of every law enforcement agency to issue citations in lieu of 
STATE OF UTAH VS. ALFREDO GUTIERREZ 
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arrest of continued custody to the maximum extent at 432 (citing A.B.A. Standards Relating to 
Pretrial Release §2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968); see also Parker, 834 P.2d at 595 ("[I]t is difficult 
to imagine any circumstances surrounding a routine traffic stop in which [an arrest] would be 
justified."). As we stated in Lopez: 
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has 
produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must be 
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional 
questioning." 
This issue is again before the Utah Court of Appealse in the case of State v. Mike 
Martinez, case number 20041090, where the Court has agreed to hear this issue on interlocatory 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the defendand did not fit into any of the four exceptions under 41-6-166, it would 
be illegal to arrest him and therefore any search incident to arrest would be illegal. 
DATED THIS /J day of June, of 2005 
^ MARTIN V. GRAVIS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
SUPPORT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF, this \^p day of June, of 2005, to: 
BRAD SMITH 
DEPUTY BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
33 S. Main St., 2A 
Brigham City, UT 84302 




(State's Opposition to Motion to Suppress) 
Amy F. Hugie, No. 8207 
Box Elder County Attorney 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
Deputy County Attorney 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Tel: (435) 734-3329 
Fax: (435) 734-3374 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





STATE'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 051100099 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through the undersigned Deputy County 
Attorney, and opposes Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Officer Gerfen's arrest and 
search were justified by the open container in plain view in Defendants vehicle. 
Defendant argues that Officer Gerfen obtained illegal consent to search the 
vehicle, having no justification to inquire further. To the contrary, the officer's 
identification of an open alcohol container in the vehicle justified further search. In State 
v. O'Brien. 959 P.2d 647 (Utah Ct App. 1998), the trial court suppressed an officer's 
search conducted after the Defendant had made furtive movements, advised the officer 
of the presence of a gun in his vehicle, and the officer saw an open alcohol container in 
plain view. The Court of Appeals reasoned that where the officer lawfully arrived at a 
- 1 -
place where the open container could be viewed, and the open container was 
immediately incriminating, "the [officer] had probable cause to arrest defendant and 
lawfully seize the evidence." 
This case presents the same circumstances. Officer Gerfen lawfully detained the 
Defendant for following too close and speeding when Officer Panter, who was assisting 
with the search, spotted an open beer container in plain view. In accordance with 
O'ESrien. that incriminating evidence gave officers probable cause to arrest the suspect 
and conduct a search incident to arrest. This is also consistent with Utah statute, which 
allows an officer to arrest without a warrant "when he has reasonable cause to believe 
the person is committing a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing 
the person may: ...(c) injure another person..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(3). An officer 
who identifies an individual with an open container in a vehicle has reasonable cause to 
believe the individual has committed a public offense and is a danger to other motorists 
and his passengers. 
Therefore, because there was reasonable cause for the arrest and search, the 
officer's search was constitutionally sound. Defendant's motion lacks merit. The State 
therefore respectfully requests that the motion be denied. 
DATED this 1 ^ day of August, 2005. 
BenjarrnirG-Kasmussen 
Deputy County Attorney 
- 2 -
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this * ^  day of August, 2005,1 faxed and mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Opposition Memorandum, to 
the following individual: 
Martin V. Gravis 
2562 Washington Blvd. 
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Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
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THE CLERK: Case 








MR. SMITH: Brad 
MR. GRAVIS: Mart 
THE COURT: This 
motion to suppress. 
evidence? 
MR. SMITH: No. 
MR. GRAVIS: No, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
number 051100099, State of Utah 
Counsel, please state your names 
Smith for the state. 
.in Gravis for the defendant. I 
is the time scheduled for a hearing 
Do counsel anticipate presenting 
Your Honor. 1 
I111 hear from you. Go ahead. 1 
read the memoranda just this morning. 1 
MR. GRAVIS: I be 
should go first. 
MR. SMITH: Your 
lieve it is the state's burden so 
Honor, the evidence in this case is 1 
ollows. A traffic stop was initiated due to legitimate J 
reasons to stop. When the 
the 
stop occurred officers approached 1 
car. Officer Panner in particular saw an open container 1 
in the vehicle. That in t 
discovered the controlled 
stop 
sear 
urn led to a further search that 1 
substance and the possession. J 
It is our contention that at each stage of the traffic 
the officers continued to detain the defendant and J 
ched only to dispel su 
observable and articulable 
the same as the case we ci 
spicions based on reasonable and 
facts. This case is identically J 
ted, State versus OfBrien, in which 
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the Utah Court of Appeals specifically held that the officer 
had probable cause to arrest the defendant and lawfully seize 
the evidence. That case was identically the same. There was 
a traffic stop based on traffic violations. The violation --
the stop in turn led to the discovery of an open container 
and an arrest and a detention. 
In this case, Officer Panner, upon approaching the 
vehicle, sees the open beer container in plain view. That 
certainly is a basis to detain the vehicle and to search 
further. And so there is in our estimation no Fourth 
Amendment issue here whatsoever. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis. 
MR. GRAVIS: That!s not quite the situation here. 
We agree that he was legitimately pulled over for traffic 
violations and the officer approached the vehicle and saw an 
open container. At that point, having no reason to believe 
that my client was either presently armed or dangerous, or 
that he had any open containers on his person, he extended 
the detention to ask content to search my client's person, 
which is where the controlled substance was allegedly found. 
Not in the vehicle, but on my client!s person. In OfBrien 
there was also drug paraphernalia. 
THE COURT: He didn't say about the open container 
until --
MR. GRAVIS: I'm not objecting to the open 
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container. We have no cause -- we agree that that was in 
plain view and the officer could lawfully seize it. It's the 
contraband allegedly found on my client that we're objecting 
to on the basis that there was no reason to extend the 
duration of the detention to ask consent to search. 
Based upon the cases we cited in our memorandum, Godina, 
Luna, the purpose of the original stop was for the traffic 
violation. The officer had reason to extend it for the open 
container, but not to extend it to search my client's person. 
And so that makes the detention illegal because of Terry. 
All the cases say you can only detain a person as long as 
necessary for what you detained him for. He has to be free 
to go before you can ask for consent to search the person. 
If he's not free to go, that's an illegal detention. 
We anticipate that the state's next argument is that it 
was a search incident to a lawful arrest. It's our position, 
under 41-6-166, that the officer did not have the legal right 
to arrest him. That again is different from O'Brien because 
in O'Brien there was also drug paraphernalia. 
41-6-166 says for any violation of something contained in 
41-6 an officer should issue a citation unless there's the 
four exceptions, which are when the person arrested demands 
an immediate appearance before a magistrate. Mr. Gutierrez 
did not. When the person arrested is on a charge of driving 
or being in actual physical control of a vehicle under the 
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influence of any drug or combination thereof as prescribed in 
section 41-6-44. That is also not the case. When the person 
is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of 
an accident causing death, personal injury or damage to 
property. That is also not the case. 
And lastly, in any other event when the person arrested 
refuses to give his written promise to appear in court as 
hereinafter provided; or when, in the discretion of the 
arresting officer, a written promise to appear is 
insufficient. In this case the officer testified that he 
J exercises no discretion. He arrests everybody he stops for 
open container. 
He had no reason to believe that Mr. Guitierrez wouldn!t 
appear on the citation. During the preliminary hearing he 
testified he didn't remember whether or not he had a valid 
J license or where he lived. Number one, he's not been charged 
with driving on suspension or driving without no license. 
Number two, the court records clearly indicate he resides 
here in Brigham City. 
It's our position that under 41-6-166 the arrest was 
unlawful and therefore the search cannot be saved as a search 
incident to an arrest. 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith. 
MR. SMITH: The argument arising out of section 166 
is certainly interesting. It's also irrelevant. Section 166 
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simply doesn't go to 
Itfs not intended to 
the legality of a search or a seizure. 
address that and it simply doesn't. 
1 We ask the question in a Fourth Amendment case based on 
the totality of the 
defense is asking yo 
strands and cut them 
somebody who is spee 
is lawfully stopped. 
container is found. 
At that point th 
detain the occupants 
circumstances. In this case what the 
u to do is to pull apart all of the 
down one by 
ding through 
When the st 
e question is 
for further 
totality of the circumstances, I 
reasonably say that 
in requesting consen-
Based on the tot< 
the officer's 
t. 
ality of the 
state!s contention that it was a 
seizure and there's no basis to s 










I do agree 
Your Honor, 
one. What you have is 1 
town, who is observed, and 
.op is initiated the open 
is it legitimate to further 
investigation? Given the 
do not believe the court can 
behavior was unreasonable 1 
circumstances, it's the J 
lawful stop and a lawful J 
uppress under the applicable 
the matter. 1 
that — 
I'm going to object. If J 
the last word. 1 
I know. I'm letting him have it both 
This isn't beyond a resonable doubt so 
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I think — 
THE COURT: No. What he's suggesting is if it was 
your motion you could start the argument and end it. If the 
burden is on him he 
MR. GRAVIS: 
starts and ends 
In civil cases 
it. 
both sides get to argue 




Anyway, our po 
did have the right to investigate th 
when the officer has 
the defendant had an 
then an unjustifiabl 
unjustifiably to con 
stop. He?s extendin 
no lawful -- no 
open container 
e detention. It 
sition is that, yes, he 
e open container, but 
facts to believe that 
on his person, that is 
increases the detention 
duct something not within the reasonable 
g the duration o 
something not connected with what he 
The case law is 
Godina and Luna that 
duration of the stop 
reasonable belief th 
-- there's lots 
says an officer 
f the detention for 
1s investigating. 
of case law besides 
may not extend the 1 
to ask for consent to search without a 
at he would find 
There's absolutely no facts that he 
containers. And it1 
container violation, 
close violation. We 
THE COURT: 
submitted, the defen 
s not connected 
a speeding viol 
submit that the 
As I understand 
dant is lawfully 
something on the person. 
would find any open 1 
in any way with an open 
ation or following too 
search is illegal. 1 
the facts counsel have 
pulled over for 
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speeding, and other traffic offenses, within the limits of 
Brigham City. During the stop, and a discussion about that, 
one of the two officers observes an open container of an 
alcoholic beverage in the passenger section of the vehicle 
where the people are, not in the trunk. Under those 
circumstances the officer would have the right, in this 
court's view, at a minimum to further pursue the matter, 
perhaps by conducting sobriety tests with the driver or other 
things, to ensure that he has not been consuming and there's 1 
no impairment. J 
You already have a traffic violation. When you couple 
that with the presence of alcohol, I think it would be 1 
negligent on the officer's part to not do some follow up J 
there. J 
Now, in that case he's entitled to detain for some J 
additional time to conduct those types of activities. The 
officer, as I understand it, asked would it be okay to 1 
conduct a pat down, a search. The defendant apparently J 
consented and then some contraband was found in a pocket on I 
the defendant. Is that correct? J 
MR. GRAVIS: That's correct. 1 
THE COURT: Under those circumstances the court 
finds that the request for permission to search was a J 
legitimate one in as much as the request was granted, consent J 












you some time before we schedule a 
now how much time you feel you need. 
We'll be asking for written findings 
of law. 
Is the court going to address the second part of the 









to take it up on appeal? 
With regards to releasing him? 





I!m not going to --
this sense. If I fi 
then once they found 
obligation at that p 











Right. Releasing him -- issuing a 
of 
of 
arresting him. Under the circumstances 
well, I guess I could address that in 
nd that the pat down search was lawful, 
the drugs they're not under an 
oint to issue him a citation and send him 
ink it kinds of loops that argument. 
Okay. 
Mr. Smith, if you would prepare a 
ings. Now, I can offer you a pretrial 







ther one. Those are both Mondays. 
The 12th would be the best. 
All right. September 12th, 1:30, for a 
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pretrial conference. We'll see you then. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, just to make sure, when you 
sign the findings of fact and conclusions of law will you 
make note to send me a copy? Last time I didn't get a copy 
until almost time --
MR. SMITH: I'll send you a copy of the findings 
before they go to the court and wait ten days to submit them. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. 
THE COURT: That way we'll you'll have an 
opportunity to object. All right. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the audio CD recorded hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 10, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box Elder 
County, Brigham City, Utah. 
Dated this 11th day of September, 2006. 
m- UAJ 
Rodney M.(;Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
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EXfflBIT 6 
(Objection to Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law) 
MARTIN V. GRAVIS (# 1237) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2562 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8231 
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IN THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
STATE OF UTAH, BOX ELDER DEPARTMENT 





OBJECTION TO THE 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 051100099 
JUDGE BEN HADFIELD 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his Attorney, Martin Gravis,and hereby objects to 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
1. Paragraph 3 in the Findings of Fact should read as follows: 
Officer Gerfen subsequently requested consent to search the defendant's person prior 
to issuing the citation and without a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts 
that the defendant had any alcohol on his person. 
2. The Court did not reach any decision on the issue of paragraph 1 of the Conclusions 
of Law. 
DATED this 2 day of September, of 2005 
MARTIN V. GRAVIS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
STATE OF UTAH VS. ALFREDO GUTIERR^ 
OBJECTION TO THE FINDINGS OF FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 051100099 
CERTIFICATE OF D: 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this 2 day of September, of 2005, to: 
AMIEHUGIE 
Box ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
01 S. Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 





(Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Objection to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.) 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND'F&R l7 r, i: 
BOX ELDER COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 





HON. BEN H. HADFIELD 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 051100099 
This matter comes before the Court, pursuant to the defendant's 
Objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, proposed by the 
prosecution. These findings and conclusions are a result of the hearing which 
occurred before the Court on August 15, 2005. 
The Court has reviewed the proposed findings and conclusions, the 
objection of the defendant, and a transcript of the August 15th hearing. The 
Court, now being fully advised in the matter, determines that the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law comport with the decision issued by 
this Court from the bench on August 15th and therefore, simultaneous with the 
entry of this memorandum decision, the Court will sign and enter the findings 
and conclusions. 
This matter is scheduled for a pre-trial conference on November 7, 2005 
at 1^ 30 p.m. 
Dated this /7 riav of October, 2005. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ay of October, 2005, I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision in the case of State 
vs. Gutierrez, case number 051100099, as follows: 
Amy F. Hugie 
Box Elder County Attorney 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Martin V. Gravis 
Attorney At Law 
2562 Washington Blvd 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ffmm 
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EXHIBIT 8 
(Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law) 
Amy F. Hugie, No. 8207 
Box Elder County Attorney 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
Deputy County Attorney 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Tel: (435) 734-3329 
Fax: (435) 734-3374 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal No. 051100099 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence 
seized in the course of a search of Defendant's person and vehicle. The matter came 
before the Court for oral arguments on August 15, 2005. The State was represented by 
Deputy County Attorney Brad C. Smith. Defendant was present and represented by 
Martin Gravis. The Court having reviewed the memoranda and considered the 
arguments of counsel, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 6, 2005, the Defendant was lawfully pulled over for traffic violations 
including speeding and following too close. 
2. While Officer Gerfen contacted the driver, Officer Panter approached on the 
passenger side of the vehicle and observed an open container of alcohol in plain 
view. 
3. Officer Gerfen subsequently requested consent to search the Defendant's 
person. 
4. Consent was voluntarily given. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the officers 
had probable cause for arrest based on the open container seen in the vehicle. 
2. In the alternative, upon discovery of an open container, the officers had an 
obligation to investigate further to determine whether the Defendant was 
impaired or otherwise a danger to the community. 
3. Officer Gerfen's request for consent was justified under the law based on his 
discovery of the open container of alcohol and need to dispel any fear that the 
Defendant may have posed a danger to other members of the community. 
4. Defendant's argument that his arrest was illegal under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
166 is rendered moot by the officers' discovery of methamphetamine on 
Defendant's person. The discovery of methamphetamine pursuant to a lawful 
search was a legitimate basis for arrest. 
5. Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied. 
oA. 
DATED this tl day of September, 2005. 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this Q> day ofrOeptemteer, 2005,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, to the following individual: 
Martin V. Gravis 
2562 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Rule 7 Notice 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), the undersigned will submit the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Judge Hadfield of the First Judicial District 
Court of Box Elder County, for signature, upon the expiration of eight (8) days from 31 
August 2005, unless written objection is filed prior to that time 
3enjamin C rasmussen B KS
Deputy County Attorney 
A 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify ths»t on this o ' day ofcSeptemfcer, 2005,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and conetA copy oi \tefore90Vn9 Prapo^ti Findings. o1 F a c \ a ^ 
Conclusions of Law, to the following individual: 
Martin V. Gravis 
2562 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Rule 7 Notice 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), the undersigned will submit the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Judge Hadfield of the First Judicial District 
Court of Box Elder County, for signature, upon the expiration of eight (8) days from 31 
August 2005, unless written objection is filed prior to that time 
Benjamin C KS^mussen as




(Order on Motion for Rehearing or Motion to Suppress and Stay Entry of 
Findings of Facts) 
Martin V. Gravis #1237 
Attorney for Defendant 
2562 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Telephone: 392-8231 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR REHEARING OR MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS AND TO STAY ENTRY OF 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
vs. 
Alfredo Gutierrez, I Case No.051100099 
Defendant. Judge: Ben H. Hadfield 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his Attorney of record, Martin V. Gravis, and 
hereby moves the above entitled Court for a rehearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress and to 
Stay Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Said Motion is based upon the Court's 
Conclusion of Law Number 1 and the fact that the Court determined at the suppression hearing that 
it was unnecessary for the Court to rule on the issue as to whether said arrest would have been legal 
under Utah Code Annotated 41 -6-166. 
DATED THIS jj_ DAY OF OCTOBER 2005 
s Martm V. Gravis 
Attorney at Law 
1 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Motion it is hereby ordered that a rehearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress be held on the 7th day of November, 2005 at 1:30 p.m., and the entry of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be stayed until said hearing. 
Dated this day of October, 2005 
BY THE COURT: ^ 
^ f i e n H . Hadfield 
/^ JUDGE, District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, MOTION FOR 
REHEARING OR MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND TO STAY ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, via First-Class Mail, Postage Prepaid this day 
ofOctober,2005to: 
Amy F. Hugie 
Box Elder County Attorney 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City Utah 84302 
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